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Abstract
A solution on a class of TU games that satises the axioms of the pre-nucleolus or -kernel except the
equal treatment property and is single valued for two-person games, is a nonsymmetric pre-nucleolus
(NSPN) or -kernel (NSPK). In this paper we investigate the NSPKs and NSPNs and their relations
to the positive prekernel and to the positive core. It turns out that any NSPK is a subsolution of
the positive prekernel. Moreover, it is shown that an arbitrary NSPK, when applied to a TU game,
intersects the set of preimputations whose dissatisfactions coincide with the dissatisfactions of an
arbitrary element of any other NSPK applied to this game. This result also provides a new proof
of suciency of the characterizing condition for NSPKs due to the rst author in his PhD thesis
published in 1994 as a discussion paper. Any NSPN belongs to \its" NSPK. Several classes of NSPNs
are presented, all of them are subsolutions of the positive core. It is shown that any NSPN is a
subsolution of the positive core provided that it satises the equal treatment property on an innite
universe of potential players. Moreover, we prove that, for any game that has a nonempty anticore,
any NSPN selects its prenucleolus as its unique element.
Keywords: TU game  Solution concept  Kernel  Nucleolus  Core  Equal treatment
JEL Classication: C71
1 Introduction
The prenucleolus and the prekernel are widely acceptable solutions for cooperative transferable utility
games. Introduced as auxiliary solutions of the prebargaining set, they became important solutions in
their own rights, heavily supported by the fact that they can be justied by simple and intuitive axioms.
Both are closely related, because they share many properties and because one, the prenucleolus, is a
subsolution of the other. Two of these properties, anonymity (AN) and the equal treatment property
(ETP), may be used, together with further axioms, to characterize these solutions (see Theorems 2.1 and
2.2).
This paper investigates the roles of AN and ETP in the aforementioned axiomatizations. Indeed, it may
be desirable to apply a solution that has the properties of the pre-nucleolus or -kernel with the exception
of AN or ETP. In order to mention one example of this kind, note that bankruptcy problems may be
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e-mail: psu@sam.sdu.dkmodeled as cooperative TU games (see, e.g., Aumann and Maschler (1985)). However, in a bankruptcy
problem, some of the creditors may be ranked so that ETP or AN may not be possible.
A solution that satises the axioms that characterize the pre-nucleolus except AN is called nonsymmetric
prenucleolus (NSPN). Similarly, a nonsymmetric prekernel (NSPK) is a solution that assigns a single
proposal to any 2-person game and satises the characterizing axioms of the prekernel except ETP.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the necessary notation and denitions, Peleg's (1986)
axiomatization of the prekernel, and Sobolev's (1975) axiomatization of the prenucleolus and two variants
(see Orshan (1993) and Orshan and Sudh olter (2003)) are presented. The set of NSPKs of a game is
contained in the positive prekernel of the game. A preimputation belongs to the positive prekernel if
it diers from some preimputation in the prekernel only inasmuch as it may assign dierent amounts
to satised coalitions, that is, to coalitions that have negative excesses. The denition of the positive
prekernel due to Sudh olter and Peleg (2000) is recalled in Section 3 in order to show that any NSPK
is a subsolution of the positive prekernel. This proof uses Orshan's (1994) necessary and sucient
condition that characterizes the NSPKs, i.e., that guarantees nonemptiness (NE). Moreover, a new proof
of suciency of the aforementioned condition is given. In fact, it is shown that, if  is an arbitrary
xed solution that satises the condition, then for any element x of  applied to a TU game, any other
solution that satises the condition, when applied to the same game, intersects the set of preimputations
that treat all dissatised coalitions in the same way as x. Inserting the prekernal for , the foregoing
statement shows NE of any solution that satises the condition.
The positive core of a game is the set of preimputations that assign the same dissatisfaction to the
coalitions as the prenucleolus does. Hence, any NSPK intersects the positive core. Moreover, an NSPN
is in \its" NSPK. In Section 4 several nontrivial classes of NSPNs are presented. Though it is not
known whether any NSPN is contained in the positive core, it is shown that an NSPN coincides with
the prenucleolus, when applied to a TU game that has a nonempty anticore (i.e., the dual game has a
nonempty core, is balanced). Moreover, an NSPN is a subsolution of the positive core, provided that it
treats an innite set of potential players equally. The proof of this result (see Theorem 4.5) is based on
a technical lemma (Lemma 4.6). Finally, Section 5 is devoted to the proof of this technical lemma.
It should be noted that the proofs of several new results use the characterization result of NSPKs, i.e.,
Theorem 3.4, whose proof was only published in a discussion paper of the rst author (Orshan (1994)),
a version of his PhD thesis. In the present paper we just recall some parts of the proof and give some
sketches or hints about the remaining parts. We do not oer the complete proof, because it is not new (in
fact more than 16 years old), quite technical, and contained in the aforementioned discussion paper. The
authors should be happy to send an electronic copy of the discussion paper on demand to those readers
who are interested in the details.
As mentioned above, in the beginning of the 19900, the rst author started investigating NSPKs. In fact,
Michael Maschler supervised his PhD thesis and motivated the investigation of nonsymmetric prekernels.
Almost at the same time, the second author tried to convince himself that AN is logically independent
of the remaining axioms (see Sudh olter (1993)) in Sobolev's (1975) famous characterization of the prenu-
cleolus. In this context, when asking whether the independence of AN was already known, Bezalel Peleg
indicated that he could not exclude that a student of Maschler, namely the rst author, knew this fact
(which was true). Hence, Peleg initiated the joint research of both authors. Moreover, he was not only
2interested in this eld of research as is documented by the existence of, e.g., a joint paper with the second
author on the positive prekernel (2000), but also motivated the research; in fact he supervised the PhD
research of the rst author for one year, when Maschler was abroad.
2 Notation, Solutions, and Properties
Let U, jUj  4, be the universe of players containing, without loss of generality, 1;:::;k 2 U whenever
jUj  k. A (cooperative TU) game is a pair (N;v) such that ; 6= N  U is nite and v : 2N ! R; v(;) = 0.
For any game (N;v) let
X(N;v) = fx 2 RN j x(N)  v(N)g and X(N;v) = fx 2 RN j x(N) = v(N)g
denote the set of feasible and Pareto optimal feasible payos (preimputations), respectively. We use
x(S) =
P
i2S xi (x(;) = 0) for every S 2 2N and every x 2 RN as a convention. Additionally, xS denotes
the restriction of x to S, i.e. xS = (xi)i2S, and we write x = (xS;xNnS). For x 2 RN; S  N; and
distinct players k;` 2 N let
e(S;x;v) = v(S)   x(S) and sk`(x;v) = max
SNnf`g:k2S
e(S;x;v)
denote the excess of S and the maximum surplus1 of k over `, respectively, at x with respect to (N;v).
The prekernel (see Davis and Maschler (1965)) of (N;v) is given by
PK(N;v) = fx 2 X(N;v)jsk`(x;v) = s`k(x;v) for all k 2 N; ` 2 N n fkgg:
For X  RN let N((N;v);X) denote the nucleolus of (N;v) with respect to X, i.e., the set of members
of X that lexicographically minimize the nonincreasingly ordered vector of excesses of the coalitions (see
Schmeidler (1969)). It is well-known that the nucleolus with respect to X(N;v) is a singleton, the unique
element of which is called the prenucleolus of (N;v) and is denoted by (N;v).
In general, a solution  associates with each game (N;v) a subset of X(N;v). Let  be a solution. Then

(1) is covariant under strategic equivalence (COV) if, for all games (N;v);(N;w) satisfying w = v +z
for some  > 0 and z 2 RN, the equation (N;w) = (N;v)+z holds. (Here we use the convention
that identies z 2 RN with the additive coalitional function, again denoted by z, on the player set N
dened by z(S) =
P
i2S zi for all S 2 2N. Also note that the games v and w are called strategically
equivalent.);
(2) is nonempty (NE) if (N;v) 6= ; for every game (N;v);
(3) is Pareto optimal (PO) if (N;v)  X(N;v) for every game (N;v);
(4) is single-valued (SIVA) if j(N;v)j = 1 for every game (N;v);
(5) is anonymous (AN) if the following condition is satised for all games (N;v). If  : N ! U is
an injection, then ((N);v) = ((N;v)), where v((S)) = v(S) for all S  N and, for any
x 2 RN; y = (x) 2 R(N) is given by y(i) = xi for all i 2 N (in this case the games (N;v) and
((N);v) are isomorphic);
1Sometimes, if (N;v) is xed, we omit v and simply write e(S;x) and sk`(x).
3(6) satises the equal treatment property (ETP) if for every game (N;v), for every x 2 (N;v), xk = x`
for all substitutes k;` 2 N (k and ` are substitutes if v(S [fkg) = v(S [f`g) for all S  N nfk;`g);
(7) is reasonable (REAS) if, for every game (N;v), for every x 2 (N;v), and for every i 2 N,
min
SNnfig
(v(S [ fig)   v(S))  xi  max
SNnfig
(v(S [ fig)   v(S));
(8) satises the reduced game property (RGP) if for any game (N;v); for every ; 6= S  N; and any
x 2 (N;v), xS 2 (S;vS;x) (the reduced game (S;vS;x) is dened by vS;x(;) = 0, vS;x(S) =
v(N)   x(N n S), and vS;x(T) = maxQNnS(v(T [ Q)   x(Q)) for ; 6= T $ S);
(9) satises the converse reduced game property (CRGP) if for every game (N;v) with jNj  2 the
following condition is satised for every x 2 X(N;v): If, for every S  N with jSj = 2, xS 2
(S;vS;x), then x 2 (N;v);
(10) satises the reconrmation property (RCP) if, for any game (N;v), for every ; 6= S  N; for any
x 2 (N;v) and y 2 (S;vS;x), (y;xNnS) 2 (N;v).
For interpretations and discussions, in particular of the variants (8), (9), and (10) of the reduced game
property, see Peleg (1986) and Hwang and Sudh olter (2001).
We now recall the classical characterizations of the foregoing solutions.
Theorem 2.1 (Sobolev (1975)) If jUj = 1, then the prenucleolus is the unique solution that satises2
SIVA, COV, AN, and RGP.
Theorem 2.2 (Peleg (1986)) The prekernel is the unique solution that satises NE, PO, COV, ETP,
RGP, and CRGP.
Of course, for a single valued solution  the axioms RGP and RCP are equivalent. So, we may replace
RGP by RCP in Theorem 2.1. Surprisingly, if RCP is used together with ETP instead of AN, then it is
possible to replace SIVA by NE so that we have the following result.
Theorem 2.3 (Orshan and Sudh olter (2003)) If jUj = 1, then the prenucleolus is the unique solu-
tion that satises NE, COV, ETP, and RCP.
Remark 2.4 By means of an example, Peleg and Sudh olter (2003, Remark 6.3.3) show that both variants
of Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.3 are no longer valid, if 4jUj<1.
In view of the foregoing remark, a solution  is called a nonsymmetric prenucleolus (NSPN) if it satises
SIVA, COV, and RGP, and if jUj = 1.
In order to dene nonsymmetric prekernels we do not simply delete ETP in Theorem 2.2, because there
are many \pathological" examples (e.g., the solution X(;) assigning the set of all preimputations to
a game) that satisfy the remaining axioms. One basic property of the prekernel is kept. Indeed, the
2Orshan (1993) shows that AN may be replaced by ETP.
4prekernel of any two-person game coincides with its prenucleolus, so the prekernel of any two-person
game is single valued. A solution  is 2-SIVA if j(N;v)j = 1 for any game (N;v) with jNj = 2. We say
that  is a nonsymmetric prekernel if  satises 2-SIVA, NE, PO, COV, RGP, and CRGP (see Orshan
(1994)).
Remark 2.5 (1) A solution that satises PO, RGP, and CRGP, is uniquely determined by the 2-
person games in the following sense. If  is a solution that satises PO and RGP, then there exists
a unique solution e  that satises PO, RGP, and CRGP, and coincides with  for any 2-person game.
So CRGP may be replaced by \maximality" (see Remark 3.12 of Orshan (1994) or Remark 3.7 of
Hwang and Sudh olter (2001)).
(2) As SIVA, COV, and RGP imply PO (see Sobolev (1975)), we conclude that every NSPN  is a
subsolution of a unique NSPK e  dened by e (N;v) = (N;v) for any game (N;v) with jNj  2.
3 Nonsymmetric Prekernels and the Positive Prekernel
In order to recall Orshan's (1994) complete characterization of NSPKs let  be a solution that satises
2-SIVA, PO, COV, RGP, and CRGP. In view of Remark 2.5 and of COV,  is determined as soon as it is
dened for all 0-1 and 0-( 1) normalized 2-person games. (Indeed, up to strategic equivalence a 2-person
game (fk;`g;v) satises v(fkg) = v(f`g) = 0 and v(fk;`g) 2 f1; 1;0g.) However, if v(fk;`g) = 0, then,
by 2-SIVA and COV, (fk;`g;tv) = t(fk;`g;v) for t > 0, so (fk;`g;v) = f0g by NE. For k;` 2 U,
k 6= `, let a
k` = ak` denote the k-coordinate of the unique element of  applied to the 0-1 normalized
game on fk;`g and let b
k` = bk` be the k-coordinate of the 0-( 1) normalized game on fk;`g. By PO,
ak` + a`k = 1; (3.1)
bk` + b`k =  1: (3.2)
Let (N;v) be a game, let x 2 (N;v), let k;` 2 N, k 6= `, and let S = fk;`g. If sk`(x) + s`k(x) < 0,
then the reduced game (S;vS;x) is strategically equivalent to the 0-1 normalized game on S so that3
ak`s`k(x) = a`ksk`(x). If sk`(x) + s`k(x) > 0, then (S;vS;x) is strategically equivalent to the 0-( 1)
normalized game so that bk`s`k(x) = b`ksk`(x). Finally, if sk`(x)+s`k(x) = 0, then (S;vS;x) is strategically











ak`s`k(x) = a`ksk`(x) if sk`(x) + s`k(x) < 0
bk`s`k(x) = b`ksk`(x) if sk`(x) + s`k(x)  0





The converse is also valid: If for all distinct k;` 2 U, ak`;bk` 2 R satisfy (3.1)and (3.2) and if  is dened
by (3.3), then  satises 2-SIVA, PO, COV, RGP, and CRGP.
An NSPK satises the foregoing 5 axioms and NE. In order to describe the impact of NE on the ak` and
bk`, we shall now briey review Section 6 of Orshan (1994) and start with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Let  be an NSPK and let any k;` 2 U with k 6= `: Then a
k`  0 and b
k` =  1
2.
3Note that sij(y) := sij(y;v) = sij
 
yT;vT;y
for i;j 2 T;i 6= j, ; 6= T  N, and y 2 RN.










ak`s`k(x) = a`ksk`(x) if sk`(x) + s`k(x) < 0
s`k(x) = sk`(x) if sk`(x) + s`k(x)  0





We do not present the proof of Lemma 3.1 that is technical and requires to consider several 3-person
games. Instead we show that Lemma 3.1 implies that any NSPK is a subsolution of the positive prekernel
whose denition is now recalled. Let t+ = maxft;0g denote the positive part of a real number t. Let
(N;v) be a game and x 2 RN. Note that the excess e(S;x;v), if positive, is interpreted as dissatisfaction
of S and may be used in a bargaining process by players of S to object against x (see, e.g., Davis and
Maschler (1967)). These considerations suggest to dene the positive prekernel of a game (N;v) to be
the set
PK+(N;v) = fx 2 X(N;v) j sk`(x)+ = s`k(x)+ for all k;` 2 N;k 6= `g:
For an analysis of the positive prekernel see Sudh olter and Peleg (2000), who present also the following
axiomatization.
Theorem 3.2 The positive prekernel is the unique solution that satises NE, AN, REAS, RGP, CRGP,
and is maximal with the foregoing properties.
Corollary 3.3 Any NSPK is a subsolution of the positive prekernel.
Proof: Let  be an NSPK, let (N;v) be a game, let x 2 (N;v), and let k;` 2 N, k 6= `. If sk`(x) +
s`k(x) < 0, then (3.3) implies sk`(x);s`k(x)  0, because ak`;a`k  0 by Lemma 3.1. If sk`(x)+s`k(x)  0,
then (3.3) implies sk`(x) = s`k(x), because bk` = b`k 6= 0 by Lemma 3.1. Hence, x 2 PK+(N;v). q.e.d.
For any k;` 2 U, k 6= `, let ak` 2 R and let a = (ak`)k;`2U;k6=`. Then the mapping a is said to generate
legal chains if for all distinct players j;k;` 2 U the following conditions are fullled:
ak`  0; (3.5)
ak` + a`k = 1; (3.6)















) aj` 2 f0;1g: (3.9)
Now we are ready for presenting the characterization.
Theorem 3.4 (Orshan (1994)) The solution  is an NSPK if and only if there exists a mapping a
= (ak`)k;`2U;k6=` that generates legal chains such that, for any game (N;v), (N;v) is given by 3.4.
It should be noted that the proof of the remaining part of the \only if" direction. i.e., the verication
of (3.7) { (3.9), is also quite technical and not presented in this paper. Regarding the \if" direction
we shall show a stronger result that is interesting in its own right. The following notation is needed.
6Let a = (ak`)k;`2U;k6=` generate legal chains, let (N;v) be a game and let k;` 2 N, k 6= `. Dene, for








sk`(x)   s`k(x);sk`(x)   ak`
a`ks`k(x)
o
, if ak`  a`k;
max
n
sk`(x)   s`k(x); a`k
ak`sk`(x)   s`k(x)
o
, if ak`  a`k:
(3.10)
The following lemma, due to Orshan (1994), is useful.
Lemma 3.5 Let a = (ak`)k;`2U;k6=` generate legal chains, let (N;v) be a game, let  be dened by (3.4),
and let f be dened by (3.10).
(1) For k;` 2 N;k 6= `; the mapping fk` : X(N;v) ! R is continuous.
(2) For any distinct k;` 2 N, fk` =  f`k.
(3) (N;v) = fx 2 X(N;v) j fk`(x) = 0 for all distinct k;` 2 Ng:
(4) For any x 2 X(N;v) the relation x on N dened by k x ` if fk`(x)  f`k(x) for all k;` 2 N,
k 6= `, is a partial order relation, i.e., reexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
Proof of (1) { (3): Any excess function e(S;) : X(N;v) ! R is continuous for any S  N so that,
as a maximum of such functions, sk` is also continuous and the continuity of fk` follows. Statements (2)
and (3) are straightforward consequences of (3.4) and (3.10), respectively. q.e.d.
We just present a brief sketch of the proof of (4) of Lemma 3.5: Note that x is clearly reexive and
antisymmetric. Let j;k;` 2 U such that j x k x `, i.e., fjk(x) > fkj(x) and fk`(x) > f`k(x). The
proof that fj`(x) > f`j(x) is technical, requires to distinguish cases (see (3.5) { (3.9)), and uses, e.g.,
the transitivity of the \outweigh relation" (k outweighs ` if sk`(x) > s`k(x), see Lemma 5.1 of Davis and
Maschler (1965)).
Orshan (1994) used the foregoing lemma to show with the help of the KKM lemma that (N;v) dened
by (3.4) is nonempty, that is, the suciency (\if") part of Theorem 3.4. We shall now use an equivalent
criterion, namely Brouwer's xed point theorem, to prove a stronger result. To this end, let x 2 X(N;v)
and denote
Z = Z(N;v;x) = fz 2 X(N;v) j e(S;z)+ = e(S;x)+ for all S  Ng:
So Z is the set of all preimputations such that a coalition keeps its dissatisfaction at x if it has some and
all coalitions satised at x remain satised.
Theorem 3.6 Let  and 0 be NSPKs, let (N;v) be a game, and let x 2 0(N;v). Then
(N;v) \ Z(N;v;x) 6= ;:
The foregoing theorem applied to 0 = PK yields non-emptiness of any NSPK .
Proof: Let n = jNj and Z = Z(N;v;x). Then Z is nonempty, compact, and convex. Dene, for any
z 2 Z, g(z) = y 2 RN by





fk`(z) for all k 2 N;
7where fk` is dened by (3.10). By (2) of Lemma 3.5, y(N) = z(N) so that y 2 X(N;v). In order to show
that y 2 Z it is remarked that, by Corollary 3.3, for distinct k;` 2 N,
sk`(z)  0 ) sk`(z)  fk`(z); (3.11)
sk`(z) > 0 ) fk`(z) = 0: (3.12)
Now, let S  N;S 6= ;. Note that, again by (2) of Lemma 3.5,






Let k 2 S and ` 2 NnS. We distinguish two cases. If e(S;z) > 0, then sk`(z)  e(S;z) > 0 and, by (3.12),
y(S) = z(S) and e(S;y) = e(S;x). If e(S;z)  0, then, by (3.11) or (3.12) respectively, fk`(z)  e(S;z).
As jSj  jN n Sj < n2, e(S;y)  0. We conclude that g(z) 2 Z.
Now the proof can be completed. By (1) of Lemma 3.5, g : Z ! Z is continuous and, by Brouwer's xed
point theorem there exists b z 2 Z such that g(b z) = b z. So we have
P
`2Nnfkg fk`(b z) = 0 for all k 2 N.
Now, (4) and (2) of Lemma 3.5 imply that fk`(b x) = 0 for all k 2 N and ` 2 N n fkg. The proof is
complete by (3) of Lemma 3.5. q.e.d.
Remark 3.7 In addition to 2-SIVA, NE, PO, COV, RGP, and CRGP, nonsymmetric prekernels have
many further properties in common with the prekernel. We mention only two of them (see Sections 7
and 9 of Orshan (1994)). (1) Any NSPK applied to any 3-person game is a singleton. (2) Any NSPK
applied to any convex games is a singleton in the core of the game. The proofs are generalizations of the
proofs for the prekernel due to Davis and Maschler (1965) and Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley (1972).
4 Nonsymmetric Prenucleoli and the Positive Core
In order to show that AN is logically independent of the remaining axioms in Sobolev's axiomatization
of the prenucleolus (Theorem 2.1), Sudh olter (1993) constructed the following example of a nontrivial
NSPN. Let (N;v) be a game. The positive core of (N;v) is the set C+(N;v) = Z(N;v;(N;v)), that is,
C+(N;v) = fx 2 X(N;v) j (e(S;x;v))+ = e(S;(N;v);v)+ for all S  Ng:
By denition, C+(N;v) is a compact convex nonempty polyhedral set. This set contains the prenucleolus
and it coincides with the core if the core is nonempty. The prenucleolus is a subsolution of the prekernel.
Hence, by Theorem 3.6 (applied to 0 = PK and to x = (N;v)), the positive core of a game intersects
any of its NSPKs.
Now, let  be any total order relation on U. For any game (N;v) dene
(N;v) = fx 2 C+(N;v) j x lex y for all y 2 C+(N;v)g; (4.1)
where lex is the lexicographic order induced by , that is, for N  U and x;y 2 RN, x lex y is dened
by
i 2 N;yi > xi ) there exists j 2 N such that j  i and xi > xj:
Then  is an NSPN that does not coincide with the prenucleolus. Note that this example is a special
case of  dened (4.7).
8Used just as an auxiliary solution in the 1990', recently it turned out that the positive core is interesting in
its own right. Indeed, Orshan and Sudh olter (2010) present several characterizations by simple properties
thereby providing a theoretical justication of this nonempty core extension. One of the main results is
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Let jUj = 1 and let  be a solution that contains the prenucleolus4. Then  satises
REAS, COV, AN, RGP, and RCP, if and only if  coincides with one of the following solutions: (a)
The prenucleolus; (b) The positive core; (c) The relative interior of the positive core.
So we may characterize the positive core as the maximal solution that contains the prenucleolus and
satises the foregoing 5 axioms.
It should be noted that the property that the prenucleolus is a subsolution of  in Theorem 4.1 may be
replaced by several sets of axioms. We mention only one. We call a solution  convex valued (CON), if
(N;v) is a convex set for any game (N;v). Then Theorem 4.1 remains valid if \contains the prenucleolus"
is replaced by \satises NE and CON".
In order to present examples of two classes of NSPNs some notation is useful. A conguration of U is
a pair (U;) such that U  2U n f;g, U =
S
fS j S 2 Ug, and  is a total order on U. Let (U;)
be a conguration. For any N  U denote N  = fS \ N j S 2 Ug n fN;;g. If k;` 2 U, then k  `
if, for all S 2 U, k 2 S if and only if ` 2 S. The relation  is an equivalence relation and the set
of equivalence classes, denoted by U, is a partition of U. Say that (U;) is feasible if for any nite
nonempty N  U and any T 2 N  there exists a maximal element S(T;N) in fS 2 U j S \N = Tg, i.e.,
if Q 2 U;Q \ N = T;Q 6= S(T;N), then S(T;N)  Q.
Note that a conguration (U;) is automatically feasible, if one of the following conditions is satised:
The inverse of  is a well-ordering. (4.2)
R 2 U ) jfS 2 U j R  Sgj < 1 or jfS 2 U j R \ S = ;gj < 1: (4.3)
If (U;) is feasible and N is a nite nonempty subset of U, then let N be the total order on N  that
is induced by , that is, for P;Q 2 N , P N Q if and only if S(P;N)  S(Q;N).
Now we are ready to dene the NSPN  generated by the feasible allocation (U;). Let N be a nite
nonempty subset of U and let S1;:::;St be determined by
N  = fS1;:::;Stg and S1 N  N St: (4.4)
For any game (N;v) dene

0 (N;v) = fx 2 C+(N;v) j (x(S1);:::;x(St)) lex (y(S1);:::;y(St)) for all y 2 C+(N;v)g (4.5)
and note that 
0 (N;v) is recursively determined by
X0 = C+(N;v) and Xi = fx 2 Xi 1 j x(Si)  y(Si) for all y 2 Xi 1g for all i = 1;:::;t; (4.6)
so that 
0 (N;v) = Xt. Hence, 
0 (N;v) is a nonempty convex compact polyhedral set. Recall that the
nucleolus of (N;v) with respect to 
0 (N;v) is denoted by N((N;v);
0 (N;v)) and dene
(N;v) = N((N;v);
0 (N;v)): (4.7)
4i.e., (N;v) 2 (N;v) for any game (N;v)
9Lemma 4.2  is an NSPN.
Proof: Schmeidler (1969) shows that the nucleolus of a game with respect to a nonempty compact convex
set is a singleton and the proof of COV is straightforward. In order to show RGP, let (N;v) be a game
and ; 6= S  N. Let RN = fR\N j R 2 Ugnf;g, that is, RN is the coalition structure of N generated
by the partition U of U. Note that, for any x 2 
0 (N;v),

0 (N;v) = fy 2 C0(N;v) j y(R) = x(R) for all R 2 RNg: (4.8)
Moreover, note that RS = fR\S j R 2 RNgnf;g, that is, RS is the coalition structure of N reduced to
S. This fact together with RGP and RCP of C+ implies that 
0 satises RGP and RCP as well.
Let the derived game (N;v) be the game that diers only inasmuch as v(R) = x(R) for any R 2 RN and
any x 2 
0 (N;v). By RGP and RCP of 0, (vS;x) = (v)S;x for any x 2 
0 (N;v). Now, b x = (N;v)
coincides with the prenucleolus of the game (N;v;RN) with coalition structure (N;v;RN). As the
prenucleolus on games with coalition structures satises RGP (see, e.g., Peleg and Sudh olter (2003,
Theorem 5.2.7)), our proof is complete. q.e.d.
Any NSPN satises 2-SIVA, NE, PO, COV, and RGP. As CRGP replaces maximality, the NSPK is a
subsolution of a unique NSPK. Let (U;) be a feasible conguration. We now determine the NSPK 
that contains . In view of Theorem 3.4 just a = (a
k`)k;`2U;k6=` has to be determined. Let k;` 2 U,
k 6= `, and let P;Q 2 U be determined by k 2 P and ` 2 Q, and let N = fk;`g, let (N;v) be the 0-1
normalized game, and let x be the unique element of (N;v), i.e., xk = a
k`, x` = a
`k. The following 2
cases may occur:
(1) P = Q: Then x = (N;v) so that a
k` = 1
2:
(2) P 6= Q: Then N  = ffkg;f`gg and there are two possible subcases: If fkg N f`g; then a
kl = 1.
If f`g N fkg; then a
kl = 0.
Note that the foregoing considerations just depend on the equivalence classes P and Q and not on their
representatives k and `. Hence, there exists a maximal element, denoted by S(P), in U that contains P
for any P 2 U. By a slight abuse of notation we write P  Q if S(P)  S(Q). These observations show
that  is determined as follows:
a
k` = 1 for all k 2 P;` 2 Q;P;Q 2 U with P  Q (4.9)
a












for any k;` 2 U;k 6= `.






for any k;` 2 U;k 6= `. We shall present
two special examples of feasible congurations that generate an NSPN in . For any distinct players
k;` 2 U say that k  ` if ak` = 1
2. Let U denote the set of equivalence classes with respect to  and
dene Uc = fU n R j R 2 Ug. Moreover, dene  on U by P  R i ak` = 1 for any k 2 P and ` 2 R
for all P;R 2 U, and dene c of Uc by U n R c U n P if P  R for all P;Q 2 U. By Theorem 3.4
and (4.3), (U;) and (Uc;c) are feasible congurations. Moreover, U = (Uc)c = U and by the above
10construction,  and c are subsolutions of . The next example shows that  6= c provided that
jUj  4.





;k;` 2 U;k 6= `: We assume that  generates
at least 4 equivalence classes. Hence, we may assume without loss of generality that a12 = a23 = a34 = 1.
Let N = f1;2;3;4g and let (N;v) be dened by
v(;) = v(N) = v(f1;2g) = v(f1;3g) = v(f2;4g) = v(f3;4g) = 0 and v(S) =  2, otherwise:
With x = (1; 1; 1;1) it is straightforward to verify that C(N;v) is the convex hull of x and  x.
Moreover, if S1;:::;St are dened by (4.4), then Si = fig and t = 4 so that the set X1 of (4.6) is dened
by X1 = fz 2 C(N;v) j z1  y1 for all y 2 C(N;v)g so that X1 = fxg an, hence (N;v) = fxg. In the
other case, if the Si are dened as in (4.4), but now for c rather than , then Si = Nnf5 ig, t = 4, and
X1 = fz 2 C(N;v) j z(f1;2;3g)  y(f1;2;3g for all y 2 C(N;v)g: We conclude that c(N;v) = f xg.





for some k;` 2 U.





and ak` 2 f0;1g for all k;` 2 U, k 6= `, with
fk;`g 6= f1;2g. Let 0 be the NSPK that diers from  only inasmuch as a12 = a21 = 1
2 and let (U;) be
any feasible conguration such that  is a subsolution of 0. The NSPN in , e , is dened as follows.
Let (N;v) be a game. If f1;2g 6 N, then e (N;v) = (N;v). If f1;2g  N; then let x be the unique
element of (N;v). If s12(x;v)  0, then dene (N;v) = fxg. If  := s12(x;v) < 0, then let y 2 RN
dier from x only inasmuch as y1 = x1 +" and y2 = x2  ", where " = (a21  a12). As s21(x;v) = , we
may conclude that a12s21(y;v) = a21s12(y;v) so that y 2 (N;v). Dene e (N;v) = fyg. The proof that
e  satises RGP is straightforward.
Though we do not have a complete characterization of NSPNs in general, an interesting result may be
deduced under some \innocent" further condition. This condition \only" requires that innitely many
potential players have to be treated equally. As, in view of Remark 2.4, jUj = 1 has anyway to be
assumed, this condition may be satised and may be regarded as not very demanding.
Theorem 4.5 Let U0  U be an innite set. If  is an NSPN such that  satises ETP on the set of
all games (N;v) with N  U0, then  is a subsolution of the positive core.
Note that under the assumptions of the foregoing theorem, if U nU0 6= ;, then there is a nontrivial NSPN.
Indeed, as shown above, there exists an NSPN in any NSPK dened by a mapping a = (ak`)k;`2U;k6=`
that generates legal chains and satises ak` = 1
2 for k;` 2 U0 and ak` 2 f0; 1
2;1g, otherwise. If, for at
least one ` 2 U n U0, ak` = 1 (or k` = 0) for all k 2 U0, then the NSPN does not coincide with the
prenucleolus. However, the NSPN inherits ETP from the NSPK on the set of games (N;v) with N  U0,
and ETP implies AN (see Footnote 2).
In order to show Theorem 4.5, the following lemma, whose proof is postponed to Section 5, is useful.
Lemma 4.6 Let jUj = 1; let  be an NSPN, let (N;v) be a game, let fxg = (N;v), let  : N ! U be
an injection, and let ((N);u) be given by
u((S)) = maxfv(S);x(S)g for all S  N: (4.12)
11Then ((N);u) = fxg.
Proof of Theorem 4.5: By Orshan's (1993) modication of Theorem 2.1, for any game (N0;v0) with
N0  U0, (N0;v0) coincides with the prenucleolus. Now, let (N;v) be a game and let ((N);u) be
dened as in Lemma 4.6 such that, moreover, (N)  U0. With the help of a characterization of the
positive core that is similar to a characterization of the prenucleolus due to Kohlberg (1971) (see (6.3.8)
in Peleg and Sudh olter (2003)) it is straightforward to show that x 2 C+(N;v). q.e.d.
Though it is not known whether any NSPN is a subsolution of the positive core, there is the following
\partial" result.
Theorem 4.7 If jUj = 1; if  is an NSPN, and if (N;v) is a game such that v(S)  x(S) for all
S  N, where x = (N;v), then (N;v) = f(N;v)g.
The proof of this theorem is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 4.8 Let jUj = 1 and let  be an NSPN. Then  satises AN when restricted to the set of games
that have a nonempty anticore5.
The following remark is useful.
Remark 4.9 Let (N;v) be a game, x 2 PK+(N;v); and k 2 N. Then there exist S;T  N such that
k 2 S; k = 2 T; and e(S;x;v) = e(T;x;v) = maxRN e(R;x;v). (We don't exclude the possibilities S = N
and T = ;.)
Proof of Lemma 4.8: Let (N;v) be a game that has a nonempty anticore, let  : N ! U be an
injection, let N0 = (N), let v0 = v, and let (N;v) = fxg. It has to be shown that (N0;v0) = f(x)g.
By COV of  and of the anticore, we may assume that v(N) = 0 and v(S)  0 for all S  N. Let k 2 N.
By the innity assumption on jUj, we may assume that N0 = (Nnfkg)[fkg for some k 2 N, k 2 UnN,
and that (k) = k and (`) = ` for all ` 2 N nfkg. Let    maxSN v(S), let e N = N [fkg, and let
the game ( e N;w) be dened by
w(S) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
v(S) , if S  N n fkg;
v(S n fkg) , if fk;kg  S;
 , otherwise;






v(S) , if k = 2 S;
v((S n fkg) [ fkg)   zk , if k 2 S:
(4.13)
Indeed, if (4.13) is valid, then, by COV and RGP, f(x)g = (N0;v0).
Assume, on the contrary, that (4.13) is not valid. Then two cases may occur:
5The anticore of a game (N;v) is the set of all x 2 X(N;v) such that x(S)  v(S) for all S  N.
12(1) There exists S  N n fkg such that v(S) = w(S) < w(S [ fkg)   zk =    zk. As v(S)  0,
w(fkg)   zk =    zk > 0. We conclude that skk(z;w) > 0. As z 2 PK+( e N;w), skk(z;w) =
skk(z;w). As k and k are substitutes, zk = zk. Now, let T  e N such that k = 2 T. If k = 2 T; then
e(T;z;w) = v(T)   z(T) < v(T [ fkg)   z(T)   zk   zk = e(T [ fk;kg;z;w);
because  zk   zk =  2zk >  2  maxS;TN v(S)   v(T): If k 2 T, then
e(T;z;w) =    z(T) < v((T n fkg) [ fkg)   z(T)   zk = e(T [ fkg;z):
In view of Remark 4.9 the desired contradiction has been obtained.
(2) There exists S  N n fkg such that v(S [ fkg)   zk = w(S [ fk;kg)   zk < w(S [ fkg) = .
As v(S [ fkg)  0, zk >   so that z( e N n fkg) =  zk < . We conclude that skk(w;z) 
e( e N n fkg;z;w) =  + zk > 0 and, as in the rst case, zk = zk, because k and k are substitutes.
Let S  e N with k 2 S. If k 2 S, then
e(S;z;w) = v(S n fg)   z(S) < v(S n fk;kg)   z(S n fk;kg) = e(S n fk;kg;z;w);
because zk + zk >  2  maxS;TN v(S)   v(T): If k = 2 S, then e(T;z;w) =    z(T) <
e(T n fkg;z;w) and, hence, the Remark 4.9 again yields the desired contradiction.
q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 4.7: By COV, we may assume that (N;v) = 0 2 RN. According to Sobolev (1975),
there exists a transitive game6 game (M;w) that satises the following properties:
(1) N  M.
(2) w(T) 2 fv(S) j S  Ng for all T  M and w(M) = v(N) = 0.
(3) With z = 0 2 RM, wN;z = v.
By (2), w(S)  0 for all S  M and w(M) = 0 so that z is in the anticore of (M;w). By Lemma 4.8 and
PO, fzg = (M;w). By RGP and (3), f(N;v)g = (N;v). q.e.d.
Remark 4.10 Let  be an NSPN. If (N;v) = f(N;v)g for any game (N;v) that has a nonempty
anticore, then, by Lemma 4.6 { indeed, the game ((N);u) has a nonempty anticore {  is a subsolution of
the positive core. Note however, that the foregoing proof cannot be used to show that f(N;v)g = (N;v)
for any game that has a nonempty anticore, because the game (M;w) may not inherit this property of
having a nonempty anticore.
5 The Proof of Lemma 4.6
As jUj = 1, we may assume that (N) \ N = ;. Denote (i) = i for all i 2 N; S = fi j i 2 Sg for
every S  N, and M = N [N. Let  = maxS;TN v(S) v(T) and  <  2jNj. Let (M;w) be dened
6A game is transitive if its symmetry group is transitive.
13be the following formula, where S;T  N:
w(S [ T) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
v(S) ; if S = T
0 ; if S = ;
v(N) ; if S = N and T = ;
 ; otherwise
(5.14)
Let fyg = (M;w);  = maxS;TN e(S [ T;y;w), and  = maxk2N (skk(y;w))+. Note that  =
maxk2N (skk(y;w))+ by Corollary 3.3.
If suces to show that  = 0. Indeed, if  = 0, then y(N)  v(N) and yN  0. Hence, by Pareto
optimality of y, y(N) = v(N) and yN = 0, thus wN;y = v by (5.14) and yN = x by RGP. Moreover, by
REAS, xi    for all i 2 N, thus wN
;y(S) = (v(S) x(S))+ for every S  N. Hence, COV completes
the proof.
In order to show that  = 0 we assume, on the contrary,  > 0 and proceed by showing the following 7
claims which nally leads to the desired contradiction. Let
N0 = fi 2 N j yi < 0g; N0 = fi 2 N j yi  0g; N0
0 = fi 2 N j yi < 0g, and N0
0 = fi 2 N j yi  0g:
Claim 1: e(N;y;w) <  : Assume the contrary. Then skk(y;w) = skk(y;w) =  > 0 for all k 2 N by
Corollary 3.3. By Pareto optimality of y there exists i 2 N with yi > 0. Let sii(y;w) (= ) be attained
by S [ T, that is,
S;T  N; i = 2 S; i 2 T; and e(S [ T;y;w) = :
By (5.14), w(S [ T)  w(S [ (T n fig)), thus
 = e(S [ T;y;w)  w(S [ (T n fig))   y(S)   y(T) < e(S [ (T n fig);y;w);
which is impossible.
Claim 2:  <  : Assume the contrary and let k 2 N satisfy skk(y;w) = . Let skk(y;w) be attained
by S[T. By Claim 1, w(S[T) = . For every pair (Q;Q0) satisfying N0  Q  N0 and N0
0  Q0  N0
0
we have
  e(Q [ Q0;y;w)     y(Q)   y(Q0)     y(S)   y(T) = ; (5.15)
thus all inequalities of (5.15) are, in fact, equalities. Hence, N0  S  N0; N0




0 n N0) 6= ;: (5.16)
Indeed, (5.16) follows from the inequality  y(R) y(R) < v(R) y(R) y(R) which is true for every
R  N.
Two cases may occur:
(1) N0 n N0
0 6= ;: Then there exists i 2 N0 n e N0. If additionally jN0j  2, then
sii(y;w)  e(N0 [ N0
0
;y;w) =    y(N0)   y(N0
0
) =  > e((N0 n fig) [ N0
0
 [ fig;y;w):
Thus sii(y;w) is attained by N0
0
 [fig in any case. As yi > 0, e(N0
0




0 6= ; and s``(y;w) >  for all ` 2 N0
0 which is impossible.
14(2) N0
0 n N0 6= ;: Then there exists j 2 N0
0 n N0. By Claim 1,
sjj(y;w) = e(N0[N0
0
;y;w) =  > max






so that the desired contradiction has been obtained.
Claim 3: yk + yk    for all k 2 N: Assume, on the contrary, that there exists k 2 N with
y(fk;kg) <  . By Remark 4.9 there exists S [T  M with e(S [T;y;w) =  and k = 2 S. By Claim
2, k = 2 T. However,
w(S [ fkg [ T [ fkg)  w(S [ T)   ;
thus e(S [ fkg [ T [ fkg;y;w) > e(S [ T;y;w) =  which is impossible.
Claim 4: e(N;y;w) <  : Assume the contrary. As in the proof of Claim 1, by PO, there exists i 2 N
with yi > 0. Let sii(y;w) (= sii(y;w) = ) be attained by S [ T. Then
e(S [ (T n fig);y;w) > e(S [ T;y;w) =  > 0 (5.17)
implies S = T n fig 6= ;. As v(S [ T) = , (5.17) implies
 > y(S) + y(T) > y(S) + y(S): (5.18)
Now, (5.18) is impossible by Claim 3.
Claim 5:      y(N0)   y(N0
0
) : Let k 2 N satisfy skk(y;w) = . By Claim 4 skk(y;w) is attained
by S [ T  M satisfying w(S [ T) = . Hence our claim follows immediately.
Claim 6: N0
0  N0 : Assume, on the contrary, there exists k 2 N0
0 n N0. By Claim 5,
skk(y;w)  e(N0 [ N0
0
;y;w)     y(N0)   y(N0
0
)  ;
thus skk(y;w) = : By Claim 4,
skk(y;w) = e(N0 [ fkg [ (N0
0




Claim 7: N0  N0
0 : Assume, on the contrary, there exists k 2 N0 n N0
0. By Claim 5,
skk(y;w)  e(N0 [ N0
0
;y;w)     y(N0)   y(N0
0
)  ;




), skk(y;w) must be attained
by N0
0
 [ fkg. Hence, N0









Now the proof can be nished. By Claims 6 and 7
y(N0 [ N0






and, by Claim 5, y(N0) + y(N0
0





)   jNj > ;
which is impossible. q.e.d.
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